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Its members are uncertain whether the government will take them seriously if they come forward to try to negotiate a resolution of their grievances. Some group members propose that the government will pay more attention if the group launches an act of terrorism to raise awareness of their cause. These members note that this worked for the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, and others. Following the terrorist action, the group debates whether to now come forward and seek concessions from the government in exchange for laying down their arms and eschewing future violence. Imagine that on average the group values a negotiated agreement with the government more than engaging in another attention-getting act of terrorism, but the members agree that such an act would be better than coming forward, seeking to make a deal only to find their group ignored or even suppressed. If the government has no declaratory policy about negotiating with terrorists, then the group is likely to be uncertain about how the government will respond if they now come forward-seeking concessions. Because this is better than the value (40) they attach to a second act of terrorism, they take their chances and try to negotiate. Perhaps they are lucky and the government turns out to be the compromiser type that grants some concessions in exchange for the group disarming and perhaps they are unlucky, with the government being the suppressor type. Suppose the government has a declaratory policy that it will never negotiate with terrorists. Because reneging on a public declaration of this sort can be costly for democratic leaders, jeopardizing their chances of reelection and encouraging future adversaries to see them as weak or lacking commitment to their stated intentions (Fearon, 1994; Smith, 1998; Schultz, 1998), the declaratory policy increases confidence in the belief that the government is the type that will not negotiate with terrorists. That is, the declaratory policy has reduced-if not completely eliminated-uncertainty about how the government will respond to a request for negotiations by the alienated group. Suppose the group now places the odds that the government is the suppressor type at 0. A second act of terrorism is valued at 40 so, with uncertainty reduced, the prospect of more terrorism increases. This reminds us that rational, strategic actors can, nevertheless, end up with bad outcomes. Risks Whereas uncertainty is about not knowing an important piece of information-say whether a government will pursue negotiations with terrorists-risk is concerned with the probability of alternative results, given different choices of action. In making a bet that I will roll a 6-sided die and come up with a 6, there is no uncertainty about the probability of a 6 being the outcome, although the bet is certainly risky. If the die is fair, then there is a 1/6 chance of rolling a 6 and winning the bet. Plus, there is a 5/6 chance of losing: Risky choices can, of course, lead to bad outcomes. Some are reluctant to take risks, while others attach so much value to a successful outcome relative to the low value they attach to failure that they favor gambling for the big win over even a fairly valued sure outcome. Estimating the willingness is a stylized example to make clear how uncertainty reduction can exacerbate rather than diminish tensions. Risk-proneness draws attention to how risks, weighted by the value or utility attached to alternative outcomes, shape expected pay-offs. Risk by itself is central to all rational choice models of decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Riker, 1996; McDermott, 1998; see also Kaplan, this volume, Chapter 2). Nondemocratic leaders who survive in office past approximately 1 or 2 years experience a significant year-to-year decline in the risk of being ousted (Bueno de Mesquita et al. So, looked at from this angle, it is easy to see why analysts and decision makers would have been taken by surprise when the Shah was deposed in 1979, 38 years into his rise to power and 22 years after his coronation. Mortality, for instance, cuts against the general trend of long-term political survival. The longer a leader is in power, the older the leader gets, and, therefore, the greater the risk of contracting a serious or even terminal illness. Analyses of political survival indicate that nondemocratic leaders known to be suffering from a terminal illness-as the Shah was-are particularly vulnerable to being deposed by a coup or revolution, apparently because their supporters, especially in the military, can no longer count on them to deliver a flow of largesse, so they factionalize as they look for a new patron to take care of them (Bueno de Mesquita et al. The risk of revolution when a dictator is dying is likely also to be increased by the propensity of such leaders to surround themselves with relatively incompetent advisors-that is, advisors who are not likely to be good candidates to become rivals of the incumbent (Sonin and Egorov, 2005).

Insurgencies have many common characteristics and patterns, while their ideological basis may vary widely. Fundamental to all counterinsurgencies is the need to assist local authorities to secure the populace and thereby separate the people from the insurgents while enhancing the legitimacy of the government. Insurgents thrive on terrorizing and intimidating the population to gain control over them. Thus, creating chaos to undercut and reduce governmental legitimacy and authority, and fostering overall instability. But American military forces must also appreciate the importance of other agencies and other missions in achieving a lasting victory. They must be prepared to render required assistance as well as perform traditionally nonmilitary tasks. The primary audience for this manual is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above. This manual applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. For definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition. The first half of this chapter describes insurgency, while the second part examines the much more complex challenge of countering it. Though globalization and technological advancement have influenced contemporary conflict, the nature of war in the 21st century is the same as it has been since ancient times, ". Means to achieve these goals are not limited to regular armies employed by a nation-state. At its core, war is a violent struggle between hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills attempting to impose their desires on another. It is a complex interaction between human beings and is played out in a continuous process of action, reaction, and adaptation. As an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force, war can take different forms across the spectrum of conflict. It may range from large-scale forces engaged in conventional warfare to subtler forms of conflict that barely reach the threshold of violence. Those definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight the key paradox that insurgency and counterinsurgency are distinctly different types of operations. However, they are related, though opposing, and are two sides of a phenomenon that has sometimes been called revolutionary war or internal war. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency, and each side has this as its aim. The insurgent attempts to overthrow or subvert an established government or authority; the counterinsurgent uses all of the instruments of national power to support the government in restoring and enforcing the rule of law. Counterinsurgency thus involves the controlled application of national power in political, information, economic, social, military, and diplomatic fields and disciplines. Its scale and complexity should never be underestimated by leaders and planners; indeed, the possible scale and complexity must be understood before the beginning of any such operation. A revolution is an unplanned, spontaneous explosion of popular will, such as the French Revolution of 1789. Insurgencies normally seek to either overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous area. Insurgency is always a form of internal war, while coups and revolutions can become such a war if they do not come to an immediate resolution. As the name "internal wars" implies, these are primarily conflicts within states, not conflicts between states, and they all contain at least some element of civil war. The one possible exception to this rule involves what can be termed a "liberation insurgency," where indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow what they perceive to be a foreign or occupation government. Such a resistance movement could be mounted by a legitimate government-in-exile as well as by elements competing for that role. During the Cold War, the Soviets and the United States played roles in many such conflicts. Today there is a growing global aspect in the form of transnational extremist organizations linked to and exploiting the internal conditions that plague failed and failing states and result in conditions ripe for insurgency.

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Adapting occurs as Soldiers and Marines apply what they have learned, assess the results of their actions, and apply the results to accomplish the mission. The books and articles that follow are not the only good ones on insurgency and counterinsurgency. They are, however, some of the more useful for Soldiers and Marines who wish to improve their ability to defeat enemies who engage them in one of the most dangerous and difficult forms of warfare. A British Major General who fought in small wars in Afghanistan and the Boer War provides lessons learned that remain applicable today. Describes the relative deprivation theory, which states that unmet expectations motivate those who join rebel movements. The best analysis of the approaches and problems on both sides during the war in Algeria. For more on this conflict, see the Battle of Algiers, a troubling and instructive 1966 movie. How the British Special Air Service raised and employed irregular tribal forces to counter Communist insurgency in Oman during the 1960s and 1970s. Explanation of the British school of counterinsurgency from one of its best practitioners. The French school of counterinsurgency, with a focus on "whatever means necessary. A Brigade Combat Team Commander in Iraq in 2003-2004 gives his perspective on Information Operations. From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary, and Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Romans to the Present. Examines the cases of Algeria, Lebanon, and Vietnam and determines that great powers lose small wars when they lose public support at home. Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam. A framework for analyzing insurgency operations and a good first book in insurgency studies. The author argues that the Army never adapted to the insurgency in Vietnam, preferring to fight the war as a conventional conflict with an emphasis on firepower. A stunning first-person account of military advisors embedded with Vietnamese units. A controversial but important analysis of the philosophical origins of the global Islamofascist insurgency. A tank battalion operations officer and counterinsurgency scholar tries out his theories in Al Anbar in 2003-4. Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Longtime scholars of counterinsurgency put the War on Terror in historical context. A former Foreign Service officer with Afghanistan experience explains the motivation of terrorists-not deprivation, but the need to belong. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander. Addresses Army problem solving, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures. Just be fore the captain passes out, he gasps to a flight attendant, "Find someone who can land this plane. A man who got most of his flight training from watch ing the High and the Mighty 27 times. I have not always agreed with them or the policies of their union, but I yield to no one in my defense of their professionalism and dedication. Pilots have taught me much about aviation and in doing so have made me a fairer, more balanced observer of the airline industry over the past 35 years. Traditionally, it has worn two hats-that of a militant union and that of an underrated professional group that has contributed more to the advancement of civil aviation than many people realize or care to admit. Here are the fascinating stories of the family feuds, the in traunion battles and bickering, the crippling strikes, the dogged steps toward safer air travel. As a fellow writer and aviation historian, I salute Professor Hopkins for his incredibly detailed research; there will be some who disagree with his con clusions and interpretations of certain events, but history has always been seen through the eyes of the beholder, and time can distort memory, par ticularly memory of controversy.

Whether conducting an interview or presenting a lesson, speakers should avoid simultaneous translations - both the speaker and interpreter talking at the same time. Speakers should talk directly to the individual or audience for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner. Speakers should observe interpreters closely to detect any inconsistencies between their manners. Speakers should present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his or her language. One way to ensure that the interpreter is communicating exactly what the speaker means is to have a senior interpreter observe several conversations and provide feedback along with further training. Soldiers and Marines should be aware some interpreters might attempt to save face or to protect themselves by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to translate what they believe the speaker or audience said or meant without asking for a clarification. This situation can result in misinformation and confusion, and impact on credibility. Soldiers and Marines should ensure interpreters know that when in doubt, they should always ask for clarification. During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, interpreters should immediately relay them to the speaker for an answer. Interpreters should never attempt to answer questions, even though they may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither speakers nor interpreters should correct each other in front of an interviewee or class; all differences should be settled away from the subject or audience. Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vital, establishing rapport with interview subjects or the target audience is equally important. To establish rapport, subjects or audiences should be treated as mature, important people who are worthy and capable. There are several methods for ensuring the speaker is communicating to the target audience and the interpreter is only a mechanism for that communication. One technique is to have the interpreter stand to the side of and just behind the speaker, leaving the speaker face-to-face with the target audience. The speaker should always look at the target audience and talk directly to them, rather than to the interpreter. This method allows the speaker and the target audience to establish a personal relationship. An important first step for Soldiers and Marines communicating in a foreign language is to reinforce and polish their English language skills. The clearer Soldiers and Marines speak in English, including the use of correct words, without idiom or slang, the easier it is for interpreters to translate exactly. Terms of surprise or reaction such as "gee whiz" and "golly" are difficult to translate. While these have become part of everyday military language, in most cases interpreters and target audiences are not be familiar with them, and it becomes necessary for the interpreter to interrupt the interview for clarification regarding the expanded form. Moreover, if interpreters should constantly interrupt the speaker for clarification, they could lose credibility in the eyes of the target audience, which could jeopardize the goals of the interview or lesson. In addition, if a technical term or expression should be used, speakers should be sure interpreters convey the proper meaning. When speaking extemporaneously, Soldiers and Marines should consider, in advance, a framework of themes for what they wish to say. They should break their thoughts into logical bits and articulate them one at a time, using short, simple words and sentences, which can be translated quickly and easily. Transitional phrases and qualifiers may confuse non-native speakers and waste valuable time. To briefly summarize these suggested techniques, speakers should- Keep presentations as simple as possible. Avoid flowery and nuanced language that would be difficult for a foreign national to interpret exactly.