"Mircette 15mcg with visa, birth control debate".

Y. Navaras, MD

Associate Professor, Emory University School of Medicine

When humanitarian was coded as a main theme in coverage (rather than just an element) then the differences were even more stark, with nearly a third of Italian coverage (31. This is most likely due to the high proportion of stories in the Italian Press which focus directly on the events in the Mediterranean and often report on the experiences of refugees and migrants. The discussion of refugees and migrants as a cultural threat or a threat to community cohesion was most prevalent in the British press (10. The prevalence of negative refugee frames could also be seen in the greater tendency for the British press to link refugees and migrants to crime (8. So, for instance, post arrival integration was a much larger theme in Germany (appeared in 19. Perhaps more surprisingly migration figures were least likely to appear in Italian newspapers (30. Also perhaps somewhat surprising was how much a focus was placed on discussion of political responses/policy in the Spanish press (69. In terms of how to address the crisis, the most frequently cited responses were vague calls for the adoption of a united or Europe wide solution to the problem (Italy 33. Conversely the view that more refugees and migrants should be rejected for asylum or deported if their claims were unsuccessful appeared at a slightly lower rate overall (Spain 12. Arguments in favour of targeting people smugglers were most prevalent in Spain (12. The second sample also saw the issue of people smuggling being explicitly blamed for the deaths in the Mediterranean, thus divulging politicians of some of their responsibility for the loss of life. The suggestion that access to benefits and welfare should be restricted in order to discourage migration appeared in both Sweden (9. Overall very little attention was paid to the push factors that were driving population flows. There were only a handful of articles across the nearly 2000 articles in the sample which focused on the need to resolve the conflict in Syria or address the abuse of human rights in states such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Sudan or Iraq. There are wide variations in how the press in different countries report on asylum and immigration. Sweden was the country whose press system was the most positive towards refugees and migrants. Despite the presence of newspapers such as the Guardian and Daily Mirror, both of which were sympathetic to refugees, the right-wing press in the United Kingdom expressed a hostility towards refugees and migrants which was unique. This could be seen in the preponderance of negative frames and the editorialising in favour of Fortress Europe approaches. There are significant differences in the level of variation within national press systems. That is to say, in some countries the press, whether left or right of centre, reported on asylum and immigration in broadly similar ways, whilst in other countries reporting was highly varied. Newspapers within these countries tended to use the same language, report on the same themes and feature the same explanations and responses. Furthermore whilst there were some variation, which can be attributed to different editorial guidelines and target audiences, in general there tended to be more differences between these countries than within them. As a consequence the institution was often presented as slow, bureaucratic and divided. In Italy it was seen as unwilling to share the burden for search and rescue operations, and the reception of refugees and migrants. The degree to which asylum and immigration is subject to political contestation is a key factor structuring coverage. The prominence of domestic political sources varies significantly between states and newspapers within states. Where the issue becomes politicised it will tend to pull in more political actors from both incumbent and challenger parties, whilst consensus will tend to produce coverage more focused on governing parties. Germany, without a far-right party in the Bundestag, is the only country in our sample where the incumbent grand coalition is challenged from the left by the Greens and the Left parties. Though it should be noted that one part of the coalition, the Christian Social Union, has struck a noticeably harder line on immigration and asylum issues than its partners.

Child welfare returned Camila to her mother after approximately 18 months, only to remove her again within three months because of continued physical and substance abuse. The child welfare system continued to allow Camila to return home, but nothing had changed. In response, Camila began running away for days at a time to escape the violence and abuse. No one in the system ever took the time to address the dynamic in the home or to explore what triggered Camila to run. Instead, Camila was dumped in a toxic environment with absolutely no supports or services for either her or her mother. No one ever asked Camila or her mother what they needed for Camila to remain safely in the home. After a few months of the cycle of running away and returning home, an incident occurred that catapulted Camila into the juvenile justice system. At this point, Camila, now 12, asked the police to put her in detention because she was "addicted to the streets. A psychologist who evaluated her while she was in detention recommended that Camila be placed in a therapeutic group home to treat her extensive mental health needs resulting from her childhood trauma. However, providers should manage expectations so that when youth have a voice in their team planning meetings, they are not let down if things do not go exactly as they wish. Training Currently many exploited children go unrecognized by social workers, teachers, and probation officers. They are often mislabeled as defiant troublemakers who are engaged in self-imposed, risky behavior. To dispel these myths and coordinate a trauma-informed response, staff from child-serving agencies and community-based providers must receive training on working with exploited youth. Each 128 Big Ideas 2015 - Pioneering Change: Innovative Ideas for Children and Families Isolated and alone, Camila was miserable, and ran away after three weeks. After two more months on the street, she was picked up on a probation violation and detained for six months in a locked camp, again with no mental health services. During questioning, police learned Camila had been kidnapped, locked up, and chained in an apartment basement, where her trafficker forced her to sell herself to strangers and turn over any money she earned. The court decided against detention and instead placed her in a foster home, which was only temporary before she was returned to her mother. Realizing her mother could not meet her basic needs, Camila returned to her exploiter. Like many of her peers who have been involved with the child welfare system, she suffered constant turmoil at home, punctuated by parental substance abuse, placement instability, failed family reunification, and violence. Some of these circumstances led to her involvement in the child welfare system, while others were the result of her interaction with the system. Given her lack of a loving supportive home, extremely young age, and high exposure to violence and trauma, she was an easy target for exploiters. Rather than being treated as a victim of serial abuse, she was neglected by the system that was supposed to protect her. Once entangled in the juvenile justice system, she was viewed as a criminal, and despite recommendations for therapeutic services, she was continually locked up and returned home with no transitional services to help her and her mother stabilize. If either the foster care or juvenile justice systems had approached her from a victim-centered, strengths-based framework, however, perhaps Camila could have actually enjoyed a normal childhood. Tracking and Using Data to Inform Policies and Practices Reform related to exploited youth should focus on improving their access to services and supports so they can safely and smoothly exit from "the life. Each child-serving agency should collect baseline data to establish the prevalence of the problem in their jurisdiction, as this will help them identify and justify any additional resources needed to serve the population. Increased identification will give them a better sense of the scope of the problem. The program can analyze whether runaway episodes have decreased, Big Ideas 2015 - Pioneering Change: Innovative Ideas for Children and Families 129 both in number and length of time, and whether youth are staying in contact with at least one adult while on the run. Similarly, data on arrest location and type of arrests may highlight emerging trends in trafficking. Survivor organizations can use data to establish the efficacy of their interventions in order to help fund and sustain their programs. Jurisdictions can also use qualitative information to better understand the barriers to success for exploited youth. Jurisdictions should also analyze the policies and procedures in place at each decision-making point in their child welfare and juvenile justice systems to identify gaps in assessing and linking youth to services, as well as in sharing information between agencies.

But even after this occurred, the loss in asset value on the S&Ls balance sheets meant that most had little or no capital at risk. They earned a profit because they earned a higher interest return on the mortgage assets than they would pay on the bonds that they have issued. This has some similarity to the S&L model, except that Fannie and Freddie can hold much larger pools of mortgages that are geographically dispersed. This implicit government backing lowered their cost of borrowing and allowed them to inflate their balance sheets enormously. The Treasury was forced to nationalize them in September 2008 and guarantee their liabilities because they would otherwise have been driven into bankruptcy. Mostly because they behaved like so many other people and believed that default rates were stable and predictable and that, at most, there would be only regional price declines and not national price declines. When the price bubble burst, they faced much higher default rates than expected and they did not have enough capital to cover their losses. Congress pushed them to provide more loans to lowincome borrowers to justify the capital advantage they had because of the implicit federal guarantee. The rules under which they operated required that they not buy subprime whole loans directly. Starting in 2004, they did begin to buy riskier loans in the face of pressure from Congress, but this was late in the game, after private subprime lending had already taken off. In 2004, once the market was already booming, it bought 10 percent of the total, and in 2007 it bought 4. Another important form of credit enhancement is "excess spread," whereby the total incoming interest received from the mortgage payments exceeds the payment made to senior and junior debt holders, fees to the issuer, and any other expenses. This is the first line of defense in terms of protection, as no tranche incurs losses unless total credit defaults become high enough to turn the excess spread negative. While some of the underlying mortgages would inevitably default, they are selected from geographically diverse areas which, it was once believed, would protect the health of the overall pool from any local default shocks; prior to the current turmoil in housing markets, there had never been a housing downturn on a national scale. The securities are typically separated into senior, mezzanine (junior), and non-investment grade (equity) tranches. A senior tranche has preferred claim on the stream of returns generated by the mortgages; once all the senior tranche securities are paid, the mezzanine holders are paid next, and the equity tranche receive whatever is left. A portion of the mortgages can go into delinquency, but various forms of protection should mean there is still enough income coming into the pool to keep paying the holders of at least the senior tranche. On the other hand, the lower tranches are much more risky and can face losses very quickly; the equity tranche has the potential for huge returns when defaults are low but are also the first to be wiped out when the default rate hits even a small amount above what is expected. Tranching redistributes the risk according to risk appetite of investors: senior tranches pay a lower yield but are safer bets, and the junior tranches pay a higher yield and are riskier. However, effective tranching of risk rests on the assumption that proper risk analysis is performed on the underlying assets. And with good reason, in the sense that the riskiness of these se- curities was in fact much higher than their ratings suggested, because the overall market slump resulted in a correlated wave of defaults. But this financial alchemy is not as strange as it seems; in fact it has been around for a long time in other markets. Typically, the claims on that income are assigned to two broad groups, the bond holders and the stock or equity holders. The bond holders get first dibs on the returns of the company and the equity holders get what is left over. In short, the idea of different tranches of assets with differing risk levels is not at all new and there is nothing inherently wrong with it. The goal is to provide investors with different risk and return options and to let investors with an appetite for risk absorb that risk. There were second and third rounds of securitization, and the trouble that emerged there was worse. The real boom in securitization since 2001 came from subprime and Alt-A loans, as the share of these loans that were securitized had jumped 75 percent since 2001. By 2006, securitization was funding most of the mortgage loans in the lower rated categories - the loans that are in trouble now. As the securitization market came to be dominated by the financial sector, it grew more complex, and more opaque.

Because of a lack of cryptography, there is no secure authentication of the smartcard to the voting terminal. This means that nothing prevents an attacker from using his or her own homebrew smartcard in a voting terminal. One might naturally wonder how easy it would be for an attacker to make such a homebrew smartcard. First, we note that user-programmable smartcards and smartcard readers are available commercially over the Internet in small quantities and at reasonable prices. Second, an attacker who knows the protocol spoken between voting terminals and legitimate smartcards could easily implement a homebrew card that speaks the same protocol. We shall shortly consider how an attacker might go about learning the protocol if he or she does not know it a priori. In short, all the necessary information to create homebrew counterfeit smartcards is readily available. In the next subsections we consider attacks that an adversary could mount after creating homebrew cards. We find the issues we uncovered to be particularly distressing as modern smartcard designs allow cryptographic operations to be performed directly on the smartcard, making it possible to create systems that are not as easily vulnerable to such security breaches. It turns out that adversaries, including regular voters, who do not know a priori the protocol between the smartcard and the terminal can "easily" learn the protocol, thereby allowing them to produce homebrew voter cards. An adversary, such as a poll worker, with the ability to interact with a legitimate administrator or ender card could also learn enough information to produce homebrew administrator and ender cards (Section 3. Let us consider several ways that an adversary could learn the protocol between voter cards and voting terminals. After voting, instead of returning the canceled card to the poll-worker, the adversary could return a fake card that records how it is reprogrammed, and then dumps that information to a collaborating attacker waiting in line to vote. Alternatively, the attacker could attach a "wiretap" device between the voting terminal and a legitimate smartcard and observe the communicated messages. The parts for building such a device are readily available and, depending on the setup at each voting location, might be unnoticed by poll workers. We comment again that these techniques work because the authentication process is completely deterministic and lacks any sort of cryptography. Since an adversary can make perfectly valid smartcards, the adversary could bring a stack of active cards to the voting booth. Note here that the adversary could be a regular voter, and not necessarily an election insider. To answer this question, we must first consider what information is encoded on the voter cards on a per-voter basis. If we assume the number of collected votes becomes greater than the number of people who showed up to vote, and if the polling locations keep accurate counts of the number of people who show up to vote, then the back-end system, if designed properly, should be able to detect the existence of counterfeit votes. The solution proposed by one election official, to have everyone vote again, does not seem like a viable solution. The administrator cards give the possessor the ability to access administrative functionality (the administrative dialog BallotStation/AdminDlg. This attack is easiest if the attacker has knowledge of the Diebold code or can interact with a legitimate administrator or ender card, since otherwise the attacker would not know what distinguishes an administrator or ender card from a voter card. Using a homebrew administrator card, a poll worker, who might not otherwise have access to the administrator functions of the Diebold system but who does have access to the voting machines before and after the elections, could gain access to the administrator controls. If a malicious voter entered an 10 administrator or ender card into the voting device instead of the normal voter card, then the voter would be able to terminate the election and, if the card is an administrator card, gain access to additional administrative controls. The use of administrator or ender cards prior to the completion of the actual election represents an interesting denial-of-service attack. Such an attack, if mounted simultaneously by multiple people, could temporarily shut down a polling place. If a polling place is in a precinct considered to favor one candidate over another, attacking that specific polling place could benefit the lessfavored candidate. Even if the poll workers were later able to resurrect the systems, the attack might succeed in deterring a large number of potential voters from voting. If such an attack was mounted, one might think the attackers would be identified and caught.